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FROM  1980  to early 1985  the dollar  appreciated  60 percent  in real terms. 
Since then it has depreciated  about 20 percent.1  These exchange rate 
movements  have made  many  observers  wonder  whether  more  is at work 
than mere changes in fundamentals,  and if so, whether such large and 
persistent  swings should  be arrested  by a return  to the gold standard,  by 
rigidly  fixed  exchange  rates  among  the major  monetary  areas, or at least 
by target  zones, either  hard  zones with bumpers  or soft zones, implicit 
and  discretionary.  Discussion of these possibilities  involves two sets of 
issues, views on which can be combined  in a variety  of ways. The issues 
are  whether  large  exchange  rate  movements  primarily  reflect  extravagant 
macroeconomic  policies or poorly working markets and whether ex- 
change  rate  fluctuations  can be contained  without  the need for subordi- 
nating  macroeconomic  policies to the exchange  rate  objective. 
There  is only one purely  market-oriented  combination  of views: "yes, 
freely flexible rates work efficiently" and "no, there should be no 
intervention."  The agnostic position concedes that markets may not 
work efficiently  but dismisses the possibility  that managed  rates would 
improve  the performance.  A third  combination  of views is that  exchange 
markets  do not function  properly  and  that  policymakers  can and should 
intervene  to improve  performance. 
Exchange markets  function efficiently 
Yes  No 
Manage rate movements 
Yes  Branson-Tobin  Marris-Bergsten 
No  Sprinkel-Samuelson  Agnostic 
1. Measured  according  to the International  Monetary  Fund's Multilateral  Exchange 
Rate  Model  (MERM)  index. 
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The final  position is that markets  work reasonably  but that there can 
nonetheless be a case for intervention.  Capital  flows, for example, may 
have to be influenced  for macroeconomic  reasons. Or exchange rate 
target zones may be useful in educating governments not to pursue 
policies inconsistent  with  more  or less rigid  exchange  rates. The  premise 
in both cases is that  differential  speeds of adjustment  in  goods and  assets 
markets  magnify  the effects of monetary  and  fiscal  policies beyond  what 
would  arise  in a rational  expectations  market-equilibrium  world  and  thus 
call for market  intervention  to avoid undesired  effects on employment 
or inflation. 
This note argues that standard  theory easily explains the pattern, 
though perhaps not the magnitude,  of exchange rate fluctuations. It 
argues  against  target  zones because they would  lock up monetary  policy 
in a way that  is sometimes  undesirable.  Ad hoc controls  of international 
capital flows via interest equalization  taxes or dual rates may be an 
alternative,  although  they are not clearly preferable  to freely floating 
exchange  rates. 
Objections to Large Exchange Rate Movements 
There are three basic objections  to large  exchange rate movements. 
The first  is primitive,  but widespread:  anything  that moves a lot moves 
too much. Asset markets,  exchange markets  in particular,  are seen as 
highly  speculative  and  not  necessarily  rational.  Asset prices  easily  detach 
themselves for extended periods from fundamentals  to go on a bubble 
that  has important  effects on resource  allocation  and  on the macroecon- 
omy. The argument  has been applied  to interest rates, and it might  be 
applied  to the stock market,  but it has an extraordinary  attraction  when 
applied  to exchange rates. Presumably  the reason is that when wages 
are relatively  fixed in home currency,  exchange rate movements  mean 
changes in competitiveness and hence in employment.  This argument 
is,  of course, particularly  persuasive when applied to appreciation, 
which ultimately  generates unemployment.  Such unemployment  may 
be only temporary,  but there may also be permanent  job loss as firms 
close down, move abroad,  or at the very least, slow their investment. 
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lower average wages because of adverse effects on profitability  and 
investment. 
The second objection involves inflation. Movements in exchange 
rates, and accompanying  movements in commodity prices, represent 
the most important  shock to an otherwise  stable  inflation  process. Sharp 
appreciation  is welcome from an inflation point of view because it 
improves  the  inflation-unemployment  trade-off.  But  a bottomless  decline 
in the home currency  is rightly  seen as an open-ended  threat  to inflation 
stability. 
The third objection concerns the political reaction to misaligned 
exchange  rates. Overvalued  currencies  often  generate  threats  of protec- 
tionist trade policies-threats  that are not, unfortunately,  counterbal- 
anced by threats  of greater  trade  liberalization  in countries  with under- 
valued  currencies.  Exchange  rate  misalignment  therefore  poses a risk  to 
an open trading  system. 
These objections,  even though  loosely stated, make  it clear  that  there 
are trade-offs.  There  is the question  of what is "too large," and there  is 
the issue of the costs and  benefits  of limiting  exchange  rate  movements. 
Finally there is the practical question of whether the recommended 
policy instruments  will work. 
Why Exchange Rates Move So Much 
A discussion of exchange rate management  presupposes an under- 
standing  of how a well-functioning  exchange  market  should  behave and 
a methodology  for recognizing  excessive volatility when it exists. In 
particular,  one should be able to judge whether  the recent volatility in 
the dollar  can be explained  by models with perfect  markets  and rational 
agents  or whether  it reflects  a serious  market  failure.  The same question 
has often been asked about bond and stock prices without ready 
acceptance  of the market  failure  argument. 
There are three popular explanations for the large movements in 
exchange  rates.  The first  is that  monetary  tightening  and  fiscal  expansion 
both cause an immediate  large  appreciation;  the second focuses on safe 
haven effects; the third  assumes that markets  are irrational.  According 
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healthy  floating  rate  regime.  The theory  is that  exchange  rate  movements 
will be large  when policy disturbances  are extreme, although  the exact 
quantitative  correspondence  between  rate  movements  and  disturbances 
remains  to be established.  According  to the third,  the dollar's  volatility 
reflects  the harsh  reality  of a market  that makes  mistakes. 
TIGHT  MONEY  AND  FISCAL  EXPANSION 
The  easiest explanation  for  large  exchange  rate  variability  comes from 
a Mundell-Fleming  model of the effects of monetary  and fiscal policy 
under  flexible  exchange  rates  with perfect  capital  mobility. 
The model assumes that asset prices and exchange rates adjust 
instantly, while goods prices adjust sluggishly. Monetary and fiscal 
disturbances  thus have large effects on real exchange rates. A highly 
simplified  model of the goods and assets markets  makes  this point: 
(1)  m-  p  =  -Xi, 
(2)  i=i*  +  e, 
(3)  =  0[(e  -  p)  + g], 
(4)  g=  -  Yg  -  g-), 
where m, p,  and e are home nominal money, the price of domestic 
output,  and  the exchange  rate. The home and  foreign  interest  rates are i 
and i*; e is the expected rate  of depreciation  of the home currency;  g is 
the real  level of government  spending.  The  model  assumes  a given  output 
and  a given  foreign  interest  rate  and  ignores  foreign  repercussion  effects 
of domestic disturbances.  Complications  are possible in all directions, 
but  they do not substantially  alter  the conclusions. Equation  1 describes 
monetary  equilibrium,  and  equation  2 imposes international  arbitrage  of 
interest  rates, which implies that the home interest  rate must equal the 
foreign rate plus the expected rate of depreciation.  The third  equation 
states that  prices move in proportion  to the excess demand  for domestic 
output, where demand  depends on the real exchange rate and on the 
level of government  spending.  Finally  equation  4 specifies that  govern- 
ment spending  adjusts  gradually  to its steady state level.2 
2. For a more complete  treatment,  see Rudiger  Dornbusch,  Open Economy  Macro- 
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Figure 1.  Effects of a Transitory Fiscal Expansion 
Domestic prices 
j3(g  =g)=0 
p  e=O~~~~~~~~~~~ 
0 
Nominal exchange rate 
The central  feature of this extended Mundell-Fleming  model is the 
fact that goods prices adjust  only gradually,  certainly  not in a forward- 
looking manner.  The sluggishness  of price adjustment  means that ex- 
change  rates  overshoot:  the  nominal  and  real  exchange  rates  immediately 
appreciate  in response to a monetary  contraction, and proportionally 
more  than  the change  in money. Over  time, as goods prices decline, the 
real exchange rate depreciates until, in the long run, the initial real 
equilibrium  is regained. 
An unanticipated  and transitory  fiscal expansion, an increase in g 
above - in equation  4, leads to an immediate  real  appreciation,  as shown 
in figure 1. At point A', which is the short-run  equilibrium,  there is an 
excess demand  for goods, and  hence prices are  rising.  Since the interest 214  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
rate  is initially  unchanged  (the  price  level being  given at a point in time), 
the nominal  exchange rate at A' is unchanging.  Hence at A' there must 
be real  appreciation,  since prices are rising  with an unchanging  nominal 
exchange  rate. 
Over time as the level of government  spending  falls and prices rise, 
the nominal  interest  rate  increases,  and  hence the nominal  exchange  rate 
will depreciate. At the same time there is a loss of aggregate  demand 
because of overvaluation  that is no longer offset by high government 
spending. Therefore the real exchange rate starts depreciating.  The 
process continues  until  real spending  reaches its initial  level and with it 
interest  rates, both nominal  and  real, as well as the real  exchange  rate. 
Perfect substitutability  of foreign  and domestic capital, adjusted  for 
expected depreciation, is expressed in equation 2 above. Adjusting 
nominal  interest rates for the respective countries permits  writing  the 
real  interest  parity  condition  as follows: 
(2a)  r=r*  +q. 
The solution to equations 1 through  4 yields a relation between the 
expected rate of change of the real exchange rate and the deviations  of 
government  spending and the real exchange rate from their long-run 
equilibrium  levels:3 
(5)  q  = oQq  -  q)  -  (g  -  g), 
and hence, substituting  in equation  2a, obtains a relation  between real 
exchange  rates, real  interest  rates, and  fiscal  variables: 
(6)  q =  q + -(r*  -  r) -  (g  -  g). 
Equation  6 explains why there is no simple linkage between the real 
interest rate and the real exchange rate. Fiscal variables and other 
determinants  of aggregate  demand  also affect real exchange rates. The 
solution  to the model  shows that  a transitory  increase  in real  government 
spending  leads to an immediate  real appreciation,  followed for some 
time by a continuing  real appreciation  before real depreciation  starts. 
The adjustment  path  for the real  exchange  rate  is shown in figure  2. The 
model  thus  produces  a coherent  explanation  for  the  exchange  rate  pattern 
3. The details  of the solution  are not of interest  for the point  made  here  and  hence are 
suppressed.  It suffices  to note that the coefficients  in equation  6 are functions  of all the 
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Figure 2.  Real Exchange Rate Adjustment to a Transitory Fiscal Expansion 
Real exchange rate 
1Jo 
Time 
experienced  in the United  States  over the past  few years. Superimposing 
the relative tightening  of U.S. monetary  policy, as measured  by short- 
term real interest differentials,  compared  with policy in the rest of the 
world  reinforces  that  point. 
The empirical support for this interpretation  comes from recent 
changes in the structural  budget deficits of the leading industrialized 
countries.  The 1980-85  appreciation  of the dollar  reflects  a vast shift in 
the international  monetary-fiscal  mix, with fiscal policy in the United 
States shifting  to a massive  deficit,  while  fiscal  consolidation  abroad  was 
unprecedented.  Table 1 shows the extent of deficits  and  the cumulative 
shift in structural  deficits. 
The model  predicts  that  the anticipation  of a return  to smaller  budget 
deficits  in the United States and of a looser stance abroad  would lead to 
dollar decline. Where the Kemp-Roth  tax cuts of 1981  brought  about 216  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
Table 1.  Government Budget Deficits, United States, Japan, and Germany,  1974-85 
Percent  of GNP 
Change  in 
structural 
1974-79  1980-84  deficit, 
average  average  1985  1980-85a 
United  States  1.1  2.7  3.7  4.3 
Japan  3.4  3.6  1.4  -  3.2 
Germany  3.0  3.1  1.5  -4.2 
Sources:  Organization for Economic  Cooperation and Development,  Economic  Outlook, various issues,  and OECD 
Econiomic Stiudies, no.  3 (Autumn  1984). 
a.  Cumulative change in inflation-adjusted structural budget deficit. 
appreciation,  the anticipation  of a balanced  budget  brought  about  by the 
Gramm-Rudman  bill of 1985  must  lead to depreciation.4 
THE  SAFE  HAVEN  ARGUMENT 
A second  explanation  for  the  dollar's  strength  focuses on international 
portfolio shifts. Increased political uncertainty  in Europe, a strength- 
ening of the relative economic position of the United States under  the 
Reagan  administration,  and economic disintegration  in Latin America 
are the motivating  forces in this international  asset shift toward the 
United States. The vehicles are many: a shift in bank  lending  from the 
less developed countries (LDCs) to the U.S.  capital market, direct 
investment in the United States, and flight into U.S.  currency and 
deposits from  the IMF-occupied  territories.5 
As a single explanation  for the recent movements in exchange rates 
the safe haven argument  is plainly  inadequate.  It works  for the appreci- 
ation but has trouble  explaining  the sharp  decline of the dollar  unless it 
postulates  an inevitable  overshooting. 
4.  See Rudiger  Dornbusch,  comments  on Jeffrey  R. Shafer  and  Bonnie  E. Loopesko, 
"Floating  Exchange  Rates after  Ten Years," BPEA, 1:1983,  pp. 79-85, for a discussion 
of this point. 
5. Capital  flight  from  debtor  countries  is particularly  emphasized  in the recent paper 
by Martin  Dooley and  Peter  Isard, "Tax Avoidance  and Exchange  Rate  Determination" 
(International  Monetary  Fund, 1986). The more traditional  safe haven argument  was 
reviewed in Peter Isard and Lois Stekler, "U.S. International  Capital  Flows and the 
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IRRATIONALITY 
The irrationality  argument  in its newest form  is that  markets  seem not 
to recognize the incompatibility  of a strong  dollar  and relatively small 
long-term  interest differentials,  which, from equation  2a, imply a low 
rate  of real  depreciation.  The implication  is that, starting  from  a high  real 
value, the dollar  will decline only gradually  to a more competitive  level 
and that, accordingly,  the large current  account imbalance  will persist 
and accumulate  with interest to give the United States, ultimately, a 
huge debt-to-GNP  ratio. Such a debt accumulation  would make the 
United States a worse debtor  than, say, Mexico. The argument  goes on 
to  say that since such an eventuality is impossible, exchange rate 
adjustments  must come sooner and faster than  is reflected  in long-term 
real  interest  differentials.  The  irrationality  of the market  lies in  the failure 
to detect the unsustainability  of the path of gradual  decline and the 
inevitability  of an exchange  rate collapse.6 
The argument  that small  long-term  interest  differentials  must imply  a 
collapse  has already  been demonstrated  over the past year. But that  may 
not  be a vindication  of the approach.  The  calculations  are  highly  sensitive 
to assumed levels of real interest rates and growth  rates in the United 
States and abroad.  They are also sensitive to the assumption  that there 
is no risk  premium.  Indeed,  as Dooley and  Isard  have  noted,  the portfolio 
shift into dollars from less developed countries may well represent a 
reduction  of the risk premium  on U.S. assets.7 Once the existence of a 
risk premium  is recognized,  the setting  of equation  2-one  of perfectly 
substitutable  capital  and risk-neutral  asset holders-no  longer applies. 
The Dooley-Isard  argument  permits  recasting  the real  interest  equation, 
now including  a risk  premium,  R, on nondollar  assets: 
(2b)  q =  r -  r*  +  R. 
6. See Isard  and Stekler,  "U.S. International  Capital  Flows"; Paul  R. Krugman,  "Is 
the Strong Dollar Sustainable?"  in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, The U.S. 
Dollar-Recent  Developments,  Outlook, and Policy Options (FRBKC,  1985), pp. 103-32; 
Jeffrey  A. Frankel,  "The Dazzling  Dollar,"  BPEA, 1:1985,  pp. 199-217;  and Jeffrey  A. 
Frankel and Kenneth A.  Froot, "The Dollar As an Irrational  Speculative Bubble" 
(University  of California,  Berkeley, 1985). 
7. Dooley and  Isard,  "Tax  Avoidance." 218  Brookings Paipers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
An increase in the risk premium  on nondollar  assets means that at 
given real interest  differentials  the U.S. currency  can depreciate  more 
rapidly.  There is accordingly  no longer  the strong  presumption  that the 
market  is on an irrational  course  that  must  end in collapse. The path  may 
be one of rapid  anticipated  real depreciation,  which asset holders are 
prepared  to accept because U.S.  assets yield compensating  returns, 
psychic or otherwise. 
Managed Exchange Rates: Coordination  and Target Zones 
The difficulties  encountered  last March  by the United States, Ger- 
many,  and  Japan  in obtaining  a worldwide  cut in interest  rates  dramatize 
the difficulty of securing international  macroeconomic coordination, 
even in a situation  where all players can come out ahead. Agreements 
involving  sacrifices  on growth  or on inflation  would  be far  more  trouble- 
some, and the near-impossibility  of coordination  spells trouble  for any 
international  agreement  to limit  the fluctuations  of exchange  rates. The 
fixed exchange rate system of the 1960s broke down because West 
Germany,  or perhaps  the United States, as one looks at it, was unwilling 
to agree  on a consistent set of policies. 
The European  Monetary  System might  be taken  as an indication  that 
coordination works, but it is  in fact nothing more than a German 
Monetary Area. The minor actors sacrifice their policy autonomy, 
presumably  to improve inflation  performance  (perhaps  at the cost of 
long-run  fiscal  problems),  and  attempt  to adjust  to the policy tone set by 
Germany.  Occasional  crises, realignments,  and capital  controls  are the 
chief means  by which  policy incompatibility  is handled. 
Nevertheless, proposals to limit exchange rate fluctuations  among 
the major  currencies  abound.  Many  seem to rest on the assumption  that 
the  job can be done without  complementary  domestic and international 
policy coordination. One especially favored proposal is a system of 
exchange  rate  target  zones. 
EXCESS  VARIABILITY 
One argument  for a target zone system relies on the alleged excess 
volatility  of exchange markets.  Asset markets,  the argument  goes, put Rudiger Dornblusch  219 
prices  on assets that  need not correspond  to fundamentals,  but that  have 
an important  impact  on the economy. For the United States, an over- 
valued dollar  leads to undesirable  external  indebtedness  and domestic 
deindustrialization.  If intervention  can be effective, then policymakers 
should step in and push the exchange rate in the direction of the 
equilibrium  value that  governments  can identify  and  point  out to specu- 
lators. By deliberately  creating  disorder  in the exchange market, they 
scare speculators  off the wrong  price and in the direction  warranted  by 
fundamentals.  The action in September 1985  by the Group  of Five to 
lower the value of the dollar  relative  to other  major  currencies  would  be 
seen as an implementation  and vindication  of this view. 
The difficulty  is knowing  what a disequilibrium  price is, and  whether 
and  when intervention  should  take place in markets  where mispricing  is 
suspected. The point is best made by figure  3, which shows real stock 
prices for the United States in the past decade. What  were the funda- 
mentals  that caused asset prices to be at a record  low in 1982  and then 
to increase more than 50 percent in three years? Is the 1982  level too 
low, or the present level too high? From 1972 to 1985, stock market 
variability  was twice as great as exchange rate variability.8  Since the 
stock market is at least as significant  as the exchange rate for the 
performance  of the U.S. economy, should  we have target  zones to avoid 
erratic  and  irrational  fluctuations  in the stock market?9  Exactly  the same 
argument  applies  to long-term  bond prices, which also show seemingly 
erratic  fluctuations  and  have a major  impact  on the economy. 
Many economists would be coy in responding  to proposals to set 
target  zones for interest  rates or for the stock market.  They would ask 
immediately  how these target  zones are to be made to stick and would 
certainly  be concerned  if the answer  were monetary  policy. Fixing  target 
zones for interest rates without regard  for fundamentals,  they would 
protest, would  generate  inflation.  The same, they would add, applies  to 
fixing the real value of the stock market. But what is different  about 
target zones for exchange rates? The only difference  I can see is that 
8. The coefficients  of variation  of real  stock  prices  and  the U.S. real  exchange  rate  for 
the period  1972-85,  using  quarterly  averages,  were, respectively,  20.8 and 10.3  percent. 
9. This  argument  has, in  fact, been  advanced  by Stanley  Fischer  and  Robert  C. Merton, 
"Macroeconomics  and Finance:  The Role of the Stock Market,"  in Karl Brunner  and 
Allan H. Meltzer,  eds.,  Essays  on Macroeconomic  Implications  of Financial  and Labor 
Markets  and  Political  Processes, Carnegie-Rochester  Conference  Series,  vol. 21  (Autumn 
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Figure 3.  Real Value of Stock Prices, United States,  1974-85a 
Index, 1980 =  100 
140 




1975  1977  1979  1981  1983  1985 
Sources:  Quarterly  data from Standard  and Poor's Corporation  and U.S. Department  of Commerce,  Bureau  of 
Economic  Analysis,  The National  Income  and Product Accounts  of  the  United  States,  1929-82  Statistical  Tables 
(Government  Printing  Office,  forthcoming),  and Survey  of Current  Business,  vol. 66 (March  1986). 
a. Standard  and Poor's  composite  index  of 500 stocks, deflated  by the implicit  GNP price  deflator. 
target  zones for  interest  rates  or  the stock  market  are  discredited  (perhaps 
excessively), while  exchange  rate  fixing  is a fad that  has a way of coming 
back. 
Even if it were quite obvious that an exchange  rate was misaligned, 
there  would still be a policy issue to be resolved. Moving  the exchange 
rate would have macroeconomic  effects on aggregate  demand  and on 
prices. Bursting  an  exchange  rate  bubble,  in the U.S. case, would  benefit 
manufacturing,  which  is certainly  suffering  from  an overly strong  dollar, Rudiger Dornbusch  221 
but it would also bring  about a swing of the U.S. external  balance and 
hence create pressure on import prices. Correction  of the exchange 
market  therefore  involves a macroeconomic  adjustment  that can easily 
push up inflation.  In the absence of conclusive action  to reduce  the U.S. 
deficit, it is not obvious that a better-aligned  exchange rate is a good 
trade-in  for a significant  increase in inflation.  At a minimum,  one must 
ask what macroeconomic  policies, here and abroad,  should  accompany 
a realignment  of rates. Lower world interest rates and U.S.  fiscal 
contraction  are, of course, the answer. Thus it may be impossible to 
avoid the coordination  issue even when one thinks  of bubble  bursting. 
INSUFFICIENT  INSTRUMENTS 
If large  changes  in exchange  rates  primarily  reflect  fundamentals,  the 
problem  will be different.  When  fundamentals  change, as in the case of 
a fiscal expansion, the equilibrium  exchange rate also changes, and 
governments  must explicitly or implicitly  shift target zones. A serious 
political  issue arises  because now the government  of a country  undergo- 
ing fiscal expansion  will quite overtly have to practice  crowding  out of 
the traded  goods sector. The objective functioning  of markets  can no 
longer  be claimed  as an argument  for a passive nonintervention  stance. 
Pressures  to use the target  zones to counter  movements  in equilibrium 
rates  will have to be resisted. The same pressures  that call in the United 
States  today  for  intervention  or  protection,  rather  than  fiscal  adjustment, 
will be vocal in calling  for a determined  effort to resist movements in 
market-determined  exchange rates. It is difficult to see that making 
exchange  rates more  of a political  issue will help make  them  move more 
often in the right  direction. 
The  outcome  would  be much  the same  if target  zones were hard  rather 
than  soft, a system  that  would  be the practical  equivalent  of fixed  nominal 
rates independent of fundamentals. Suppose a country sets  out to 
stabilize inflation  by reducing  money growth. In the absence of wage- 
price  controls,  interest  rates  will have to rise to bring  about  the recession 
that slows inflation.  The increase  in interest  rates in turn  attracts  capital 
and leads to currency appreciation.  Pursuing  a policy of rigid target 
zones would make  it difficult  to reduce inflation.  To avoid the apprecia- 
tion, monetary  policy could not turn  restrictive  in the first  place. 
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the economy is driven  by expansionary  fiscal policy. In such a case, to 
hold  the exchange  rate,  monetary  policy would  in  effect have  to monetize 
the deficits. The exchange rate would remain  unchanged;  there would 
be no crowding out except on a world scale; and there would be a 
maximum  of inflation.  This is, of course, what would have happened  in 
the United States in 1980-85  if monetary  policy had defended  the 1980 
value of the dollar  in the face of the Kemp-Roth  tax cuts. The Volcker 
disinflation  would simply  not have occurred. 
The upshot  of all this is that  as long as legislatures  or administrations 
reserve the privilege of enacting extravagant  fiscal policies, market 
prices, from  exchange  rates  to interest  rates, will adjust;  fixing  some will 
quite possibly make others move even more. The lesson is that large 
international  divergences  in monetary  or fiscal  policy will be reflected  in 
exchange rates. To avoid these fluctuations, bad policies must be 
avoided.  Accommodating  a poor  fiscal  policy by exchange-rate-oriented 
monetary  policy simply  adds yet another  folly. 
INSTITUTION-BUILDING 
Some analysts who favor target zones understand  that an effective 
system of target  zones requires  international  coordination  of monetary 
and  fiscal  policies.  10  They also recognize  that  as yet there  is no effective 
method of coordination.  But they argue that setting target zones for 
exchange  rates would  be a first  step in educating  governments  to pursue 
good policies. They seem to envision a scenario in which, when the 
Kemp-Roth  tax cuts led to exchange  rate  problems,  the U.S. Congress, 
recognizing  the target  zone commitment,  would simply  have rescinded 
the tax cuts. Europe, in the same  way, would  have abstained  from  fiscal 
consolidation. 
It is difficult  to believe that  such  conditions  for  international  monetary 
and fiscal coordination  are at hand. No government  in a large country 
easily sacrifices its fiscal autonomy to an exchange rate target. The 
United States will not, nor will Germany,  Japan, or even the United 
Kingdom.  Promoters  of target  zones should  be quite  frank  to admit  that 
10. See, for example, John Williamson,  The Exchange Rate System (Washington, 
D.C.: Institute  for International  Economics, 1985). Rudiger Dornbusch  223 
without  fiscal  coordination  their  scheme  will more  often  than  not involve 
abuse of monetary  policy. It therefore  may well introduce  even more 
instability. The lack of fiscal convergence so far makes this almost a 
certainty. 
It is entirely correct to try to build institutions  that ultimately  help 
promote  reasonable  policies. But in this respect the world economy is 
at a very early stage, in which the negotiation  of an ad hoc consensus; 
for example the present one on interest rates, is the best we can hope 
for. 
Directing and Containing Capital Flows 
Whether the safe haven argument  or the Mundell-Fleming  model 
applies,  when excessive incipient  capital  inflows  move currency  values, 
the traded  goods sector, and  possibly  the entire  macroeconomy,  suffers. 
There  are several ways out. The first  is to impose a rigid  exchange rate 
system, a prescription that assumes that fixed exchange rates can 
accommodate  any disturbances.  This is the "discipline" argument  for 
fixed rates. 
A second solution is to avoid international  interest differentials  by 
using  monetary  policy: whenever  a fiscal expansion  drives  up exchange 
rates, a monetary  expansion would keep interest rates in line interna- 
tionally  and thus take the pressure  off exchange rates. The third  possi- 
bility  is to break  the tight  international  interest  rate  linkages,  rather  than 
sacrifice  fiscal autonomy or subordinate  monetary  policy to exchange 
rate  targets. 
There  are  in principle  three  ways to tamper  with  international  interest 
rate  linkages.  The first  is direct control  of capital  flows. A country  with 
an  incipient  currency  appreciation  would  limit  capital  inflows  by restrict- 
ing borrowing  from abroad for some or all classes of assets and by 
precluding  the repatriation  of assets held abroad.  Whether  the strategy 
would work is another  question. The record  on capital  controls is hard 
to interpret.  The common argument  is that they are circumvented  the 
moment  they are imposed, but of course the same argument  was used 
for the income tax when it was first  suggested  as an important  source of 
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substantially  work. Even though  capital  controls  are practiced  by most 
countries  in one form or another, they are difficult  to apply for a large 
country  with  many  firms  that  have  extensive international  transactions."I 
Given these difficulties, attention centers on two market-oriented 
measures, the  "Tobin tax"  and a real interest equalization tax as 
proposed, for example, by Liviatan.12 A more radical  form would be a 
dual exchange rate regime, in which trade is conducted at a fixed rate 
while all capital account transactions  occur in a separate  market  at a 
flexible rate. The purpose  would be to reduce the dominance  of capital 
flows over real activity and  the inflation  process. 
The Tobin  tax would  reduce  the incentive  for short-term  capital  flows 
by imposing  a small uniform  tax on all foreign exchange transactions. 
Such a tax would tend to penalize short-term  capital flows, or "hot 
money," and  reduce  their  impact  on exchange  rates. An interest  equal- 
ization tax would also narrow  the net return  to nonresidents  and  reduce 
incipient  inflows. Of course, it would not eliminate  these inflows  unless 
it also applied to repatriation.  Administrative  complications  could be 
considerable,  but so are  the disruptions  that  follow from  the laissez-faire 
system or from  second-best  policies under  target  zones. 
Ultimately, a more severe control of international  capital  flows may 
be unavoidable. Most international  capital flows today involve tax 
sheltering  or tax evasion rather  than socially  productive  resource  trans- 
fers. Shifting  capital  internationally  in search  of tax havens has become 
a nasty evasion of ordinary  tax discipline, as is obvious in light of the 
massive capital  flight  from  debtor  countries-easily  $100  billion-in  the 
past ten years. This footloose capital is parked tax free in shelters, 
helping promote an overvalued dollar and serious fiscal and social 
problems  in the countries  of origin. 
11. For  a discussion  of U.S. attempts  at controlling  capital  outflows  in the early 1960s, 
see Richard  N. Cooper,  "The  Interest  Equalization  Tax:  An Experiment  in the Separation 
of Capital  Markets,"  Finanz  Archiv  N.F., vol. 24 (December  1965),  pp. 447-71. 
12. See James  Tobin, "A Proposal  for International  Monetary  Reform,"  in Essays in 
Economics:  Theory  and  Policy (MIT  Press, 1982),  ch. 20; N. Liviatan,  "Anti-Inflationary 
Monetary  Policy and  the Capital-Import  Tax" (Warwick  Economic  Research  Papers  171, 
1980).  See,  too,  Mario  Monti  and  others,  Capital  Controls  and  Foreign  Exchange 
Legislation, Occasional  Papers (Euromobiliare,  Milano, June 1985);  Charles  Wyplosz, 
"Capital  Controls  and  Balance  of Payments  Crises"  (INSEAD, Paris, 1984);  and  Rudiger 
Dornbusch,  "Special Exchange  Rates for Capital  Account Transactions,"  World  Bank 
Economic Review (forthcoming). Rudiger Dornbusch  225 
Rather  than  attracting  capital  from  debtor  countries  by offering  a tax 
haven, thus undermining  already  precarious  efforts at stabilization,  the 
United States should charge rent on the place in the sun. The same 
argument applies to politically motivated capital flows. And in the 
process of constructing  a system of reasonable taxation of footloose 
capital, the United States would create an administrative  framework 
that would make it possible to implement  ad hoc temporary  interest 
equalization  taxes that  are complements  of major  macroeconomic  shifts 
in monetary  or fiscal  policy. 
Once such policies are accepted  as feasible, two issues remain.  First, 
the international  coordination  necessary to help implement  the scheme 
would raise many of the problems  of achieving  agreement  that arise in 
connection  with target  zoning. Second, limiting  the degree  of exchange 
rate movement would affect the distribution  of crowding out.  For 
example, in the context of a fiscal expansion, exchange appreciation 
crowds out net exports. But if an interest  equalization  tax were used to 
limit the appreciation,  home output  and employment  would be greater 
and the world interest rate higher. Crowding  out would tend to take 
place abroad  as a result  of increased  world  interest  rates, and  the impact 
of exchange  appreciation  on inflation  would be limited. It is not certain 
that such an eventuality is to be preferred  to an overvaluation  that 
crowds out net exports and contains inflation, with adjustment  costs 
postponed  until  the policy comes to an end. 
The main difference  between target zones, reinforced  by monetary 
accommodation,  and interest equalization  taxes, a Tobin tax, or dual 
rates  is that  in the latter  cases monetary  policy remains  free  for domestic 
stabilization.  Such  flexibility  is to be preferred  to a habitual  subordination 
of monetary  policy to exchange  rate  targets. Occasional  ad hoc interest 
equalization  taxes and occasional ad hoc monetary  coordination  seem 
to be a better  system among  the unconverged  industrial  countries  than  a 
promise  of target  zoning  without  an idea of how to make  it stick. 
Concluding  Remarks 
Even though ad hoc policies toward capital flows can, in principle 
and  perhaps  in practice,  achieve a more  favorable  adjustment  to distur- 
bances, what is finally  at issue is not the exchange rate system but the 226  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
policy shocks. At this stage the priority  must be to reduce world real 
interest  rates, taking  advantage  of the leeway provided  by the oil price 
decline to solve fiscal  problems,  LDC debt problems,  and the problems 
of financial  institutions. 
It is worth noting that the most fervent advocates of target zones 
invariably  have in mind  sharply  increased  budget  deficits  in Japan  and a 
much stronger  yen. It is true that under  a system of target  zones Japan 
will have trade problems, which larger budget deficits and currency 
appreciation  might  be a way of preventing.  We may think the average 
Japanese household saves too much, but it is difficult  to believe that 
better resource allocation or full employment  requires such a shift in 
Japan's policies. A much better case could be made for Germany,  at 
least on the basis of the high levels of unemployment  prevailing  there. 
There is no indication, however, that either Germany  or Japan sees 
deficit  spending  as a priority.  Nor does sound  public  finance  or anything 
else suggest  that  they should  go on a Kemp-Roth  fling.  If we do not like 
Japanese net foreign lending and feel that we suffer because of it, we 
should  tax it, if necessary at exorbitant  rates. If that is administratively 
difficult  we should  ask our  Japanese  friends  to do so for us and  to spend 
the proceeds. In that way we reduce the incentives to Japanese  savers 
or at least direct  the lending  to Europe  or capital-starved  LDCs. Insisting 
on their building sewers is at best a roundabout  way of solving the 
problem. 
But  the  main  puzzle  remains  this:  what  makes  it so difficult  to recognize 
that lower interest rates, not bigger  foreign deficits or an appreciating 
yen, are economically and politically attractive, free, and feasible? 
Lower interest rates solve the world's problems  better than getting an 
extra dollar  of budget  deficits abroad  or raising  the yen another  penny, 
whether  by target  zones or otherwise. 